INTRODUCTION
New governance-legal reform emphasizing the role of non-state actors in influencing behavior against a backdrop of the state 1 -is an important emerging intellectual movement. 2 New governance scholars are "engaged in developing a broad menu of legal reform strategies that involve private industry and nongovernmental actors in a variety of ways while maintaining the necessary role of the state to aid weaker groups in order to promote overall welfare and equity." 3 A central feature of new governance is extralegal regulation that privileges private actors in rule setting and rule enforcement, 4 which marks a shift from the previous state centric or market mechanism regulatory approaches. 5 Although the term "new governance" appeared in the literature relatively recently, 6 the underlying idea of private regulation against a backdrop of state enforcement is not new. This Article traces that idea through a review of literatures addressing corporate social responsibility; 7 environmental nongovernmental organizations, 8 and the study of norms in law and economics. 9 Each of these literatures foreshadowed the emergence of new governance by observing that industrial action can be regulated by private regulatory schemes operating against the backdrop of state regulation.
Critiques of new governance scholarship center on the lack of detailed empirical studies illustrating the principles in action. Leading articles are critiqued as having a "high level of generality" 10 and focusing on "ambiguous" and "scattered" policy assessments with innovations found "here and there." 11 As a result, examples in the field appear "aberrational, idiosyncratic, or unproven, and the anecdotes and case studies heralding these developments unconvincing . . . ." 12 Adherents to new governance agree that there is a pressing need for detailed studies examining the circumstances of when non-state regulation succeeds. 13 This Article joins in the task of providing examples of new governance 14 to provide a detailed analysis of new governance operating within a particular industrial setting. It conducts a new institutional economics 15 analysis of the industrial features that led to voluntary, market-based sustainability certifications for forests and forest products. Sustainability certifications are a voluntary, primarily private 16 regulatory regime that incentivizes firms to conduct their operations in accordance with what the certification identifies as socially desirable standards. 17 For reasons previously unexplored, the forest industry contains an unusually longstanding example of sustainability certifications. 18 This Article presents a case study of sustainability certifications in the forest industry. First, it describes the emergence and interplay between the leading forest and wood product certifications. 19 This Article provides a novel account of the first forest sustainability certification, The American Tree Farm System. A modern, comprehensive account of the history and development of the American Tree Farm System does not exist in scholarly literature across relevant disciplines-including law, natural resources, environmental sciences, corporate social responsibility, and forestry. Yet, the American Tree Farm System plays a crucial role in understanding the later proliferation of other sustainability certifications within the forest industry. It also highlights that sustainability certifications emerged not as private self-notre dame law review [vol. 88:5 regulation by an industry, but instead as a public-private partnership, in which state agency employees and industry actors worked together to enforce standards. 20 Second, this Article identifies the industrial features that contribute to the continuous, seventy-year existence of sustainability certifications within the forest industry. Drawing upon legal, sociological, and economic literature about forest use, 21 it argues that the emergence of certifications in the forest industry are attributable to: (1) the existence of rich, well-developed norms among a merchant group comprised of large, industrial land managers and state foresters; (2) a resource-type that is conducive to user generation and enforcement of rules; and (3) a robust competition for private regulatory control over industry activity.
The findings provide a starting point for further research about both the conditions under which new governance can operate in practice 22 and the broader discussion about when new governance is an appropriate means of regulating the behavior of industrial actors. Although forest sustainability certificates produced a significant "greening" of the industry, 23 their success both individually and collectively remains extremely controversial. This underscores that there is no agreed-upon set of metrics to evaluate new governance regimes. Two themes for evaluation of new governance regimes emerged from the forest sustainability certification case study: (1) the inclusiveness of diverse groups of stakeholders in new governance relative to democratic processes; and (2) the displacement of other, more stringent legislation by new governance regimes.
Part I situates new governance literature amidst existing scholarship. This Part argues that a new institutional economics analysis can address the void of practical examples within new governance literature. Part II provides a novel case study of the emergence of sustainability certifications within the domestic forest industry. Part III identifies norms, rule development and enforcement, and a robust market for regulation as the factors that contribute to the ongoing existence of sustainability certifications in the forest industry. Part IV situates the findings from forest sustainability certifications into the broader framework of understanding the industrial culture and con- 20 See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 21 Bruce Ackerman argues that lawyer-economists should "look to the sciences of culture . . . anthropology, sociology, and sociolinguistics" to address the perceived limitations of neoclassical economics. Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 6 DUKE L.J. 929, 941-42 (1986) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, George Priest suggested that "one must abandon the notion that law is a subject that can be usefully studied by persons trained only in the law." George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437, 437 (1983) . Priest argued that "the best writing about the legal system is interdisciplinary." Id. at 440.
22 This Article highlights, but does not resolve, the problem of establishing metrics with which to evaluate the "success" of new governamce. See infra note 86. ditions in which new governance strategies will emerge and whether they should be considered successful.
I. NEW GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
A central critique of new governance literature is the lack of practical, real-world examples. 24 Existing examples in the field have been critiqued as idiosyncratic and unconvincing. 25 Thus, a central, unexplored inquiry in new governance literature is: What are the conditions-the underlying industrial culture-in which private regulation emerges? 26 Detailed institutional analysis is needed to further scholarly understanding. This Article provides a detailed look into conditions underlying a longstanding private-public partnership to govern resource use, using a new institutional economics approach. This Subpart outlines other literatures that anticipated new governance.
A. New Governance in Existing Literatures
Private forms of social regulation working in tandem with government institutions are rapidly supplanting older, state-centric models of market regulation. 27 New governance 28 focuses upon non-state actors governing their own behavior based on self-generated norms and rules, 29 with decreased reliance state enforcement powers. 30 New governance has been called a "third way" 31 between regulation and market mechanisms, in which a global public 24 See Karkkainen, supra note 2, at 476. 25 Id. at 477. 26 Lobel, supra note 1, at 982 n.206 ("[V]oluntary self-regulation . . . will work better in certain situations, especially when a particular set of incentives exists. The culture of the industry is significant . . . . More detailed research is required in order to understand these differences and accordingly adopt adequate policies.").
27 See Mundlak & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 5, at 606-07 ("The world of regulation has undergone a major transformation over the last four decades, from the traditional statecentered 'command and control' regulation of the 1970s to market-based instruments (still marshaled by the state) that characterized the turn of the century, and then to the various types of new governance mechanisms that are in vogue today."); see also domain helps governments to produce effective action. 32 In the international context, 33 the rise of new governance is attributable to the failure of traditional state governments to respond to the challenges of globalization and related environmental problems. 34 Although the uptick in new governance scholarship is recent, the idea of private regulation of commercial exchange is well-established in several strands of legal literature. 35 Corporate law, environmental law, and law and economics literatures point towards the importance of incorporating institutional analysis into the theoretical arguments of new governance. 36 This Subpart argues that existing literatures inform the theoretical underpinnings of new governance and provide a starting point for further inquiry of its operation in practice.
The Corporate Law Literature: Corporate Social Responsibility
An example of new governance is when an industry creates rules to control the behavior of firms within it. A recent example of such private regulation is found in the corporate law literature on corporate social responsibility. Corporate social responsibility describes industries and companies attempting to contribute to the resolution of societal problems although they are not legally required to do so. 37 The term "corporate social 32 40 Corporate social responsibility is premised on a belief that corporations are well-situated to address social problems because of their financial resources, human talent, and influence. 41 Companies engage in socially responsible activity for a variety of reasons, including: building their brand, developing a corporate culture of giving, attracting consumers, and preventing regulation. 42 Corporate social responsibility targets a plethora of social issues, including labor relations, information privacy, and environmental issues. 43 A key dispute about corporate social responsibility is whether firms' practices meaningfully increase social welfare or merely provide an illusion that firms are good citizens. 44 Todd Henderson and Anup Milani have expressed skepticism towards the assumption that firms-rather than nonprofit entities or government agencies-are relatively better-positioned to obtain socially desirable objectives. 45 Supporters of corporate social responsibility suggest that industries are better-suited to promulgating rules and monitoring their observance within the industry group, rather than through external legal regulation. 46 They also note that while corporate codes were once considered public relations strategies, they have matured into genuine 
Environmental Law: Economic Tools for Preservation
A variety of regulatory approaches are used to address environmental problems. Prior to the 1990s, environmental objectives were typically pursued using top-down command and control regulation. 48 In the late 1980s, some leading environmental law scholars argued that environmental protections were best achieved using private market forces rather than regulation. In 1988, Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart argued that market mechanisms would save money and improve administrative efficiency. 49 Such arguments led to the adoption of marketable permits, 50 which were put into practice in 1990 through the Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide emissions trading program. 51 The program was regarded as a success because it reduced costs and incentivized technological innovation. 52 Growing dissatisfaction with market-mechanisms is leading to increasing contemplation of private regulation as a mechanism to address global environmental concerns. Global problems like climate change called into question the efficacy of market mechanisms. 53 Scholars have begun to search for complements to market mechanisms to solve environmental problems. 54 Some suggest that new governance may provide new tools for addressing troubling environmental issues. 55 
Norms Literature
Norms literature critiques legal centralism in which government is the primary creator and enforcer of rules. 56 Within close-knit groups, extralegal, norm-based dispute resolution processes may be more efficient than formal legal structures. 57 Norms literature illustrates that industry actors define their own rules, 58 and that the success of transactions depend upon trust, which reliance upon formal legal dispute resolution systems may undermine. 59 In 1991, Robert Ellickson published the canonical book Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, 60 which argued that norms-implicit rules of behavior reflecting shared understanding of expression of communal values 61 -governed how parties resolved conflict. 62 Ellickson's case study of cattle ranchers in rural Shasta County showed that conflict over problems such as cattle trespasses were not resolved by reliance upon law and courts but instead through use of norm-based resolution mechanisms. 63 Ellickson's work gave birth to a vast progeny of norm case studies, 64 documenting norms in close-knit groups including tuna sellers, 65 
B. New Institutional Economics
This Article provides a new institutional economics analysis of the industrial features under which new governance emerges as a strategy to solve environmental problems. New institutional economics incorporates institutional laws, rules, customs, and norms into economic analysis. 70 Ronald Coase is a leading proponent of studying the institutions in which economic transactions and regulatory regimes occurred. 71 Coase provides the classic example of going beyond "blackboard economics" 72 to study the law as it is, and drawing lessons from real-world findings. 73 Coase suggests that studying the process of exchange without specifying the institutional setting "makes little sense" 74 and "is as if one studied the circulation of the blood without having a body." 75 Coase believes that institutional details are particularly relevant when analyzing policy formation, providing a necessary complement to theoretical analysis. He argues that policy formation must understand how various institutions-firms, markets, and regulations-work in practice. 76 Legal scholars have, at times, returned to Coase's focus on institutional details to provide context and nuance to law and economic analysis. 77 This has primarily occurred within the norms literature, in which case studies providing excellent accounts of institutional detail abound. 78 But, legal scholars have largely left the work of identifying institutions and analyzing their inner workings to social scientists. 79 Recently, legal scholars have re-engaged with studying institutions using a new institutional economics approach. 80 The rise of "new institutional economics" has spilled over to law and economics, reenergizing the immersion of legal scholars in institutional details. Legal scholars have recently taken a new institutional economics approach to environmental law, 81 labor law, 82 speech institutions, 83 and contract law. 84 This Article provides a "gritty, detail-oriented" 85 new institutional economics analysis of new governance. To drill down to the appropriate level of industry detail, a great deal of narrowing must be done. This Article focuses on sustainability certifications, a subset of corporate social responsibility, which is a subset of private regulation. Within sustainability certifications, 
C. Sustainability Certifications
Sustainability certifications communicate that participating firms are following a set of practices that supposedly enhance social welfare. 87 The certifier-typically an industry group or NGO 88 -establishes a set of criteria reflecting a goal that it believes will appeal to consumers, such as "dolphin safe" or "fair trade." 89 The organizing body creates a logo that firms meeting the criteria can place on their product, production facility, or website to market their products. The certifier often monitors firms to assure compliance with certification criteria. Consumers express preferences towards certain kinds of manufacturing processes or ingredients by purchasing certified products, relying upon the certifiers' assurance that products bearing that 86 There are numerous important questions about the metrics with which the "success" of sustainability certifications within forest industry, or any industry, should be measured. The "success" of certifications in forestry could potentially be described in terms of the longevity of sustainability certifications within the industry, a consensus based upon siviculture analysis that they produce better forest outcomes that laws alone, Meidinger's suggestion that they have "greened" the forest industry, or increasing formalization or inclusion of standards. See BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL., GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOR- EST espite an appearance of 'representativeness,' the composition of the institution is not an accurate signal as to whether the institution is undertaking voluntary regulation that will have an overall beneficial effect on the greater community.").
Questions must also be raised about the extent to which this private regulation has displaced government regulation; the opportunity costs of resources allocated to sustainability certifications; and the costs of certification on stakeholders including small timberland owners. There is considerable controversy concerning the relative merit of various sustainability certifications within the forest industry, but this academic debate has primarily occurred within schools of forestry and environmental science. Interdisciplinary scholars, particularly those with legal, sociological, and business backgrounds, can provide valuable perspectives to better define the metrics used to measure success in new governance.
87 logo have been produced in accordance with the organizing bodies' guidelines.
Firms' motivation to participate in certification programs can include: market pressure, seeking access to broader markets, capturing price premiums, desire to forestall regulation, or desire to undermine more rigorous sustainability programs. 90 Sustainability certifications are active in fishing, 91 chemical companies, 92 conflict-free diamonds, fair trade coffee, tea, cocoa, and cotton. 93 Certification programs are lauded as promoting transparency, accountability, and public participation 94 relative to traditional regulatory regimes. 95 They "encourage proactive industry, reduce transactions costs and accelerate achievement of environmental targets due to less legal action and conflict." 96 Certifications transmit business practices to other parts of the world, particularly in environments where government regulation fails. 97 To situate sustainability certifications in the literatures discussed above, 98 they are an example of new governance, in which private actors regulate firm behavior against a backdrop of limited state involvement or enforcement but in parallel with existing governmental regulations on the industry. Corporate law scholars view sustainability certifications as a tool in the toolbox of corporate social responsibility, a form of third party assurances to substantiate claims of responsibility and insure uniform adherence to industry best practices. 99 Environmental law scholars have heralded the rise in sustainability certifications as the emergence of a post-market mechanism regime in which the state is dethroned as the sole regulatory power and pri- vate actors take a larger role in controlling firm behavior. 100 Law and economics literature situates certifications as reflective of the idea that "production can be accomplished either through a series of market transactions and contracts, or under the guidance and control of a hierarchical governance structure within a firm." 101 Norms scholars, who have yet to comment directly on certifications, will likely view them as a new iteration of extralegal regulation similar to previously observed forms of industry selfgovernance.
In sum, sustainability certifications are a blend of corporate social responsibility, private regulation, and new governance. Forestry certifications are a longstanding example of a sustainability regime that has, arguably, produced positive environmental and social outcomes. 102 Despite this, little research has been undertaken to analyze how forest sustainability certifications emerged and the conditions under which they have long played a role in industry practices. What are the institutional characteristics underlying the emergence of this form of private regulation in forest industry? This inquiry provides much-needed information about the institutional features in which proposals for new governance regimes to resolve environmental problems can develop.
II. NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE FOREST INDUSTRY
This Part contains an original case study of the first forest sustainability certificate, the American Tree Farm System, which started in 1940s. The case study is constructed from primary materials archived at the Forest History Society at Duke University. The analysis provides key, previously unexplored information about the industrial characteristics that gave rise to voluntary self-regulation within the forest industry. Then, it briefly describes the key features of newer, competing certifications.
A. An Overview of Forest Sustainability Certifications
There are three primary sustainability certifications for timberland and timber products in the United States. 103 There are an assortment of failed certification systems that began but did not gain traction within the forest industry and thus no longer exist, including the National Wood-System certification was created to identify landowners who provided good stewardship of their land through responsible forest practices. 104 In 1993, an environmental nongovernmental organization spearheaded the Forest Stewardship Council certification, which verifies that wood is harvested using legal logging practices from the forest of origin as lumber moves through the supply chain. 105 In 1994, the forest industry responded to the creation of the FSC certification by starting a third forest sustainability certification: the Sustainable Forestry Initiative. 106 112 It does, however, provide a novel account of the previously overlooked American Tree Farm System and outlines the key features of the more recent certifications. This case study lays the foundation for analyzing the industrial culture in which new governance emerged as a mechanism for obtaining environmental goals. This case study both contributes to the discussion of the conditions under which new governance is likely to emerge and the more controversial topic of how new governance efforts should be evaluated.
B. The American Tree Farm System
Virtually all scholars who have studied forestry certification programs attribute the beginning of forestry certification programs to the establishment of FSC in the early 1990s. But, in fact, the American Tree Farm System ("ATFS") began identifying some forests as sustainably managed fifty years prior to the advent of the FSC. Unlike other forest certifications, the ATFS is tied to the timberland rather than the timber products produced from it.
Because there is little substantive information about the American Tree Farm System in legal scholarship, 113 this section presents a somewhat ADMIN. 37, 37 (2012) (using four case studies to investigate the "intersection between forest management and climate policy"). 73, 92 (1985) (listing as the facts of a tax case that the plaintiff was a member of the American Tree Farm System); J. Jared Snyder, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule, in GLOBAL WARMING 647 (ALI-ABA, 2008) (discussing the battle between LEED and other rating systems which gives rise to potential antitrust implication to adopting the LEED rating system). extended history about the organization, which is vital to understanding why new governance emerged within the industry. This case study is constructed from primary materials archived at the Forest History Society at Duke University.
Inception and History of the American Tree Farm System
Domestic timber harvest practices underwent a large shift in the first half of the twentieth century: firms shifted from viewing the forest as a singleextraction "timber mine" to a sustained yield "tree farm." Weyerhaeuser Timber Company was an early adopter of the forest-as-a-tree-farm philosophy. On June 12, 1941, the company devoted a 120,000 acre timberland near Elma, Washington as a "Tree Farm," a renewable resource, forest management program. 114 The positive publicity generated by the Weyerhaeuser Tree Farm prompted West Coast members to recommend that the National Lumber Manufacturers Association sponsor a national Tree Farm program. 115 In early 1941, the National Lumber Manufacturers Association resolved to establish a national tree farm system 116 called the "American Tree Farm System" (ATFS). 117 "Tree Farm" was defined as "an area dedicated to the growing of forest crops for commercial purposes, protected and managed for continuous production." 118 Private landowners were granted the right to use the name "Tree Farm" if they met four standards, including: (1) using land for the production of forest crops, (2) providing reasonable protection from fire, insects and disease, and from damage by excessive grazing, (3) harvesting crops in a manner to assure future crops, and (4) furnishing information as requested regarding the progress of the Tree Farm. 119 In exchange for meeting these standards, the organization provided timberland owners an insignia that signified that the land was maintained according to the ATFS standards. 120 Participants posted the tree farm insignia signs on their property and used it in their letterheads and advertising. 121 Tree Farms were sponsored regionally in the West and by state in the East and Midwest. 122 In eastern and central states, state forestry departments administered the program-including promoting, inspecting, and approving the certification and dedication of Tree Farms. 123 In the West, Forest Practice Committees comprised of industrial foresters administered the programs.
From its inception in 1941, growth of the ATFS was rapid. 124 Tree Farms comprised 120,000 acres of timberland in 1941, 5 million acres in 1942, 7.5 million acres in 1943, and 17 million acres in 1949. 125 The certification standards were very low initially, with many certifications granted in recognition of established management. 126 Four hundred landowners in Alabama and Arkansas were largely certified without on-the-ground inspection of their property. 127 A "publicity man," rather than a forester, conducted the program in those states. 128 The certification came under scrutiny, 129 criticized of being used to "cover up for a lack of sound conservation practices." 130 Further, there was a misperception among the public that the ATFS was a tax dodge exempting landowners from taxes. 131 By 1946, about half of the states participated in the ATFS, each with regional organization and certification criteria. 132 In 1946, the National Lumber Manufacturers Association delegated responsibility for the ATFS to the subsidiary American Forest Products Industries. In 1954, the central organization polled industry stakeholders on a variety of topics in an effort to improve the reputation of the program. 133 Stakeholder input ultimately led to the November 5, 1954 adoption of the "Principles of the American Tree Farm System," which specified the definition, sponsorship, purpose, requirements, and inspection of Tree Farms. 134 Despite early growth, the ATFS was at risk of collapse by the late 1960s due to insufficient funding and inattentive leadership. 135 Industrial foresters did not believe that the Tree Farms produced public relations benefits and viewed tree farm inspections as unpaid work. 136 Only ten states had functioning Tree Farm organizations. 137 In 1968, the American Forest Institute, the successor to American Forest Product Industry, assumed responsibility for the ATFS. 138 It began a large campaign to rejuvenate the ATFS, 139 including re-inspecting tree farms, excluding under-performing timber operations, and bolstering state tree farm organizations. 140 The success of the certification continued to wax and wane from the 1970s to 1990s. 141 Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the ATFS instituted a number of measures to increase the credibility of its certification. 142 
Factors Animating the Creation of the American Tree Farm System
It is useful to contextualize the emergence of the ATFS against the backdrop of the conservation movement and timber industry at the time of the inception of the program. Members of the forest industry created the ATFS to address perceived problems of dwindling supply, threatened government regulation, risk created by wildfire, and negative public perception. 144 Each of these factors is discussed below.
First, the forest industry was struggling to adapt to declining virgin timber stands. 145 Prior to the late 1920s, commercial logging operations were typically conducted as final-period transactions in which landowners would purchase property, clear cut it, and then sell or abandon it. 146 Forest resources were approached as a "timber mine" from which the resource was extracted a single time. 147 Conservationists anticipated that the decline of virgin (previously-uncut) tree stands would force the timber industry to adopt conservative forestry techniques. 148 146 FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY, supra note 114 ("For decades, high tax rates on forestland gave timberland owners little incentive to hold on to the lands and reforest them after logging. Rather, it was cheaper to buy timberlands, log them, and then walk away and default on the taxes."). cut trees each year to ensure the contined capacity of the forest to provide wood product. 149 In 1929, author Stewart H. Holbrook challenged this single-use of timberlands and coined the term "timber farming" to reflect a concept of timberland being cut and re-harvested. 150 Conservationist Gifford Pinchot supported the view that forestry should operate as tree farming. 151 Second, and in a related point, members of the timber industry sought to avoid government regulation or public ownership of timberlands. 152 In 1941, the United States Forest Service announced that there were two alternatives for managing forests: either public ownership of timberland or national regulation of forestry practices. 153 Industrial timberland owners objected to national regulation 154 and instead proposed self-regulation 155 or state regulation 156 of forest practices. Forest Service Chief Lyle F. Watts criticized the creation of the ATFS as an attempt by industry to avoid federal regulation of private timberlands. 157 One publication described the success of the industry in offsetting the push for public forests and national regulation as "[winning a] major policy battle with the United States Forest Service by the use of public relations." 158 Third, wildfire threatened the viability of commercial sustained-yield forestry, 159 particularly because timberlands were self-insured. 160 Tree Farms were viewed as an opportunity to educate the public about the importance of fire prevention. 161 In conjunction with the advent of the ATFS, Weyerhaeuser invested in an infrastructure of lookout towers, telephone lines, and roads to enable firefighting efforts. 162 The Tree Farm movement was applauded as "accomplishing a feat of indoctrination unparalleled in conservation history" by arousing public interest in the danger of wildfire where the Forest Service and conservation efforts had failed. 163 Fourth, the industry sought to respond to the changing public perception of forestry. 164 Managers sought to portray themselves as conservators, rather than devastators, of forest resources. 165 The ATFS adopted what were, at the time, considered best practices, beyond what was legally required and yet still fueled by a profit motive. 166 Participation with the ATFS was not, however, philanthropic preservation of swaths of timberland 167 , but instead a mechanism to secure ongoing commercial production. 168 Over time, the public relations component of the ATFS became increasingly important. A 1967 report noted that the ATFS was "the first, last and best hope the industry has of demonstrating to small landowners, govern- should start a Tree Farm without first determining that it will be a profitable venture. Tree Farms are for the commercial production of forest products and are not to be confused with efforts to grow trees for esthetic purposes."). ment officials, politicians and people in general that it cares." 169 In 1983, an employee of the Weyerhaeuser Company recommended that the ATFS be developed into a marketing agency. 170 In 1991, the ATFS commissioned a report about public perception of its program. 171 The emergence of the American Tree Farm System marks the advent of a sustainability certification within the timber industry. Fifty years after the creation of this certification, two new certifications emerged, developed by the Forest Stewardship Council and the Sustainable Forest Initiative. Below is a brief summary of these certifications, details of which are well-documented in environmental law.
C. Subsequent Sustainability Certifications

Forest Stewardship Council
In the 1980s, "environmental [nongovernment organizations] raised public concerns about rapid deforestation, . . . [including] clear-cutting practices in North America." 172 Government regulation was failing to address deforestation. 173 In 1993, a coalition of non-governmental organizations lead by the World Wide Fund for Nature started the nonprofit Forest Stewardship Council, a certification regime. 174 FSC accredits third-party auditors to certify forestry firms who comply with sustainable forest management practices. 175 The sustainability standards and governance of the organization are controlled by nongovernmental organizations with ties to environmental, social justice, and industry representatives. 176 Voting membership is comprised of an economic chamber representing commercial interests, a social chamber for socially beneficial forest management interests, and an environmental chamber for environmentally friendly forest stewardship. 177 FSC is an umbrella organization that sets certification standards for independent certifiers, who determine that harvesters meet compliance standards prior to marketing their wood as FSC certified. 178 FSC describes its standards as "the highest social and environmental requirements in the forestry sector," 179 an assessment with which leading academics 180 and environmentally conscious companies seemingly agree. 181 Williams Sonoma catalogues bear the FSC logo, 182 and Wal-Mart 183 and Lowe's prefer FSC over other certification standards. 184 Empirical studies show that FSC produces quantifiable, positive impacts on forests. 185 "FSC's key alliances are with environmental [nongovernmental organizations] and buyers groups, as well as [its] certified producers and sellers." 186 Despite its popularity with environmental groups and commentators, FSC initially experienced somewhat limited success with large industrial actors 187 and was, at first, primarily adopted by smaller timberland owners. 188 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative Certification
Forestry landowners were skeptical and hostile towards the founding of the FSC because it was created by nongovernmental organizations rather than members of industry. 189 But, forest industry insiders recognized the value of sustainability certifications as a mechanism to improve their public image without competing with one another on environmental issues. 190 In the 1990s, the forest industry developed the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) as an outgrowth of the pre-existing American Forest and Paper Association. 191 SFI has undergone significant changes over time. Critics have described the initial standard as a vague code of standards. Early SFI standards did not commit to indigenous and traditional use rights, worker safety, or to local, employment, and community involvement. 192 In response to ongoing public scrutiny of the program and a desire to compete with FSC, SFI institutionalized its practices and structure. 193 SFI began promoting third-party audits in 1998, 194 now operates under the control of a multi-stakeholder board, 195 and has developed requirements pertaining to indigenous and traditional use rights, worker safety, local employment, and community involvement. 196 
III. INDUSTRIAL CULTURE UNDERLYING THE EMERGENCE OF NEW GOVERNANCE
Despite extensive scholarship on forest sustainability certifications, there is limited analysis as to why certifications have lasted a particularly long time within the forest industry. The void is understandable because many of the leading researchers of forest certifications are themselves entrenched within schools of forestry, rendering the unique characteristics of the industry unremarkable to them. 197 Legal scholars have focused on the features 198 or potential effects 199 of certifications rather than on the characteristics of the forest industry.
This Article addresses this void by examining the question: why have sustainability certifications played an ongoing role in governing the forest indus-try for over seventy years? What features of the forest industry contribute to the ongoing certification program within it? This analysis draws upon legal, economic, and sociological literatures to argue that the features present within the forest industry are key to the sustained presence of private regulation within it. 200 Three features are inexorably linked to the longevity of forest sustainability certifications: (1) strong, preexisting norms within the industry, (2) an industrial model in which industry actors have superior information relative to bureaucrats on which to formulate rules, and (3) competition among private regulators to set and enforce meaningful rules.
A. Norms among Industrial Foresters
Theorists have hypothesized that there is a link between strong, existing social structures and the success of regulation-if a private regulatory regime conforms to existing social structures, it has a greater likelihood of success. 201 This section identifies and discusses the norms in the forest industry that have played a crucial role in the longevity of sustainability certifications.
Norms in Industrial Forestry
The forest industry operated under norms and private rules before the advent of new goverance. 202 Forest managers conducted themselves according to a set of norms governed by reputational bonds and social sanctions. 203 Both industrial and government foresters (that is, employees of state and federal forestry agencies) operated under a shared set of norms. 204 Disputes between foresters were resolved using norm-based dispute resolution mechanisms, without reliance upon the laws governing the conflict. 205 This cooperation diminished, however, when state and federal agencies evolved to prioritize goals other than commercial timber harvest. 206 Systems of norms are most robust when participants have: (1) repeated interactions, (2) a great deal of information about each other, and (3) a small number of group members. 207 The forest industry features each of these characteristics. Foresters comprise a small group constrained by stringent licensing requirements. They typically attend one of a handful of col-leges offering forestry degrees, work for private industry for decades prior to obtaining managerial positions, and interact regularly both commercially and socially. 208 Further, there are a limited number of companies that conduct commercial timber operations. Large timber operators enjoy considerable economies of scale and have subsumed smaller companies as industry profit margins lowered. Thus, the relatively high barrier to entry to becoming either a landowner or a forester historically produced a small, homogenous group of industry actors. 209 Foresters working for competing firms regularly transact on issues ranging from snow removal to fire protection. 210 They cooperate to finance, build, and maintain private road systems, enforce trespassing violations, resolve issues of timber trespass, and extinguish wildfires. Contracts are enforced using a variety of norm-based enforcement mechanisms rather than legalized dispute resolution techniques. 211 Industry actors have a strong sense that relationships should be governed by a spirit of cooperation and well-established norms. 212 Foresters stringently enforce best practices and punish those who violate shared norms. 213 Three specific norms within the timber industry seemingly propel high participation rates in certification regimes; the norms of: (1) cooperation for the sake of relationship preservation-a sense that land managers will transact in the future and thus need to preserve relationships instead of seeking maximum individual benefit in each transaction, (2) industry protectionacting in solidarity against perceived threats of regulation or boycott, and (3) participation-that established land managers participate in maintaining and promoting the forest industry through participation in licensing boards, industry organizations, alumni organizations, agency appointments, and conferences.
Norms and the Sustainability Certifications
Pre-existing norms, rules, social sanctions, and merchant groups enabled the forest industry to respond quickly to the creation of the NGO-created FSC certification. Foresters used preexisting industry groups-the American 
B. Forest Users have a Comparative Advantage at Developing Rules Regulating Forest Use Relative to Bureaucrats
Users often have superior rule-making ability relative to bureaucrats because of their particularized knowledge of their setting and situation. 220 Forest certifications, at their core, create a set of rules that companies must follow; 221 the sanction for violating rules is losing the ability to advertise a product as certified. Unlike government regulatory regimes, industry-produced sustainability certifications are developed and enforced by resource users. This section draws upon sociological, ecological, and economic studies of rules governing forest usage 222 to argue that the nature of the forest industry was particularly well-suited for the emergence of new governance regulation.
Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom devoted a significant portion of her career to studying how communities respond to rules governing the protection of forests. Relying upon a large, international database of worldwide forestry practices, Ostrom debunked two myths about forestry practice with direct relevance to this project. Her empirical studies of rules regulating forest use indicated that user-generated and enforced rules are superior at preventing deforestation relative to top-down regulation developed and enforced by outsiders.
First, Ostrom disproved that local people are unable to make rules appropriate for governing resources. 223 Ostrom's empirical research indicated that forest usage and protection rules generated by local users produced superior protection against deforestation relative to externallydeveloped rules. 224 Users make appropriate decision-makers in environmental contexts, where they may be the first to detect resource deterioration and recovery, and thus be able to adjust the rules accordingly. 225 Sustainability certificates within the forest industry benefit from the quick transmission of information among users. Orly Lobel argues that new governance requires the "protection and encouragement of individuals within the organization to point to problems and to engage in active dissent." 226 The flat organizational structure of the industry groups governing the ATFS allowed ideas to be quickly transmitted, considered, and developed. The ATFS began with a single company initiating an idea, which was transmitted from a regional industry association to a national industry association within one year. Industry actors were continuously surveyed for ideas on how to improve the certification through letters, surveys, and studies.
Entrusting users with rulemaking authority does not necessarily result in overexploitation of the resource. For example, Margaret Blair identifies forest communities that systemically under-harvest their forests relative to sustainable production levels so as to provide should a higher level of resources be needed in the future. 227 Ostrom has demonstrated that "[w]hen residents do not believe that the government has the right to regulate their resource use, they will often find ways to resist or sabotage . . . regulations." 228 Second, Ostrom debunked the myth that top down enforcement is needed to protect forests. 229 John Terborgh has argued that a top-down approach must be taken to enforce resource rules because local communities are unable to manage their resource systems alone. 230 Ostrom tested this theory by looking to several case studies. She disputed Terborgh's analysis, finding that enforcement was more effective when enforced by forest users. 231 Sociological literature about forests suggests that land users are uniquely situated to adapt rules to changing economic and ecological conditions. Foresters are experienced at developing rules about their land usage to reflect "ecological changes and new economic opportunities." 232 They do so in a variety of formal and informal ways, including developing comprehensive timber harvest plans that are the basis for logging operations and deciding when in a forest life cycle to harvest and sell timber. Foresters also exhibit broad capacity to self-enforce rules. 233 They regularly oust trespassers from land and follow fire safety practices. 234 Foresters self-enforce rules or, when norm-based enforcement fails, refer rule violations to government law enforcement agencies. But, Ostrom's study of rule generation focused on forest users, not merely forest owners. The value of user-generated rules raises a concern about forest sustainability certifications and new governance more broadly: whether it is appropriately inclusive of stakeholders. At inception, the ATFS included only government and private foresters and did not include broader stakeholder groups. Therefore, the early iteration of this certification seemingly had fewer opportunities for stakeholder input relative to democratic, legislative processes. Recently, forest certifications have broadened inclusion of stakeholders-including conservation groups and indigenous peopleswhen developing rules for certification. But, questions about the relative inclusiveness of stakeholder perspectives remains an important concern when assessing the success of new governance regimes.
C. Competition to Regulate
Corporate law scholars have observed that the private sector is likely to self-regulate in the face of strong social pressure to reform its practices. 235 Industry actors evaluate the success of self-regulation in relation to other private and public regulatory regimes. 236 This section discusses the strong public and political pressures surrounding the forest industry, industry perception of those pressures, and the extent to which these conditions led to the successful development of forest sustainability certifications. It begins by discussing the historic and current interaction between government regulatory bodies. Then it discusses competition among various certifiers in the "market to regulate"-spheres in which private regulatory regimes compete against government regulation and one another. others caused industry actors to be cautious when making claims about the success of the program. 238 Prior to the advent of the ATFS, the Forest Service made many failed attempts at national regulation of timberland cutting and management. 239 The forest industry argued that states and industry actors were best positioned to create and enforce rules appropriate for local timber practices. Decades later, FSC was created in response to continuous government inaction. Conservation groups were frustrated by the inability and unwillingness of national governments to address deforestation, and so implemented an extra-governmental regulatory regime.
In some ways, certification served as a middle course between top-down and bottom-up regulation: national standards were broad and responsive to stakeholder input and state standards focused on particular timber types. Enforcement through local inspectors allowed flexibility for local conditions. But, this observation raises an issue that lies at the heart of assessing the desirability of new governance strategies: the concern that new governance approaches may displace more robust regulatory regimes that would otherwise emerge. In the forestry context, the crucial question is whether the emergence of sustainability certifications complemented other regulatory tools to produce environmental benefit or displaced potentially more stringent legislation.
Competition Among Certifiers
Kenneth Abbot and Duncan Snidal assert that competition among regulators can exert pressure for would-be regulators to raise standards. 240 This section argues that the competitive market to regulate forest practices has improved the standards of each certifier.
Notably, independent industry-sponsored competitors to FSC have arisen in every country where FSC has gained traction. 241 Competition between FSC and SFI certifications is intense. Organizations supporting SFI have brought antitrust litigation against organizations-such as the LEED green building certification-which favor FSC products. 242 Organizations supporting FSC, in turn, seek to undermine the credibility of SFI through direct-to-consumer public relations campaigns. 243 The emergence and continued competitiveness of FSC has improved forestry practices by motivating SFI to develop and change and vice versa. Errol Medininger comments:
While SFI began in part as a rear-guard action to halt the continuing decline in timber industry credibility while heading off more stringent regulation, it nonetheless seems to represent a significant greening of the American forest products industry. The SFI principles to which the industry has committed would have been almost unthinkable even a decade ago. 244 Thus, competing private regulatory systems within the forest industry have contributed to converging, improving practices. There remains, however, the important question of whether this improvement would have occurred if not for the threat of government regulation and public pressure to improve environmental practices.
IV. THE ROLE OF INDUSTRY CULTURE IN NEW GOVERNANCE
New governance scholars suggest that private regulation provides a valuable complement to government regulation, but provides limited examples of new governance regimes in practice. This Article addresses the issue headon by applying a new institutional and economics analysis to the following questions: What industrial features give rise to new governance regimes? What features contribute to the endurance of certifications over time? This Section argues that the case study of forest certification tells us much about when new governance is likely to emerge. But, forest certifications do not offer a magic bullet of judging the success of new governance regimesinstead, it provides a mixed account in which extra-governmental regulation has improved over time but is impossible to compare with legislation or treaties that might have otherwise been enacted.
The "success" of sustainability regimes are at once hotly contested and well-studied, suggesting there is no easy answer as to whether this form of regulation should be evaluated as a success. Thus, this Article provides insight into the likelihood of new governance regimes to emerge in industries with a pre-existing system of norms, a resource type best governed by users, and competing private regulatory systems to spur continual improvement. Through its exploration of an early forerunner to modern new governance approaches, this Article highlights both the successes and limitations of new governance.
A. Corporate Social Responsibility
The corporate social responsibility literature describes sustainability certifications as if they were a self-contained unit. The case study of forestry certification regimes pushes back against this limited frame of analysis and encourages scholars to take a broader look at the entire environment surrounding the industry.
For example, corporate literature explains that firms are motivated to join certification regimes because of a price premium or broadened market access. In the case study of forest certifications, however, participants know that there is no price premium but continue to participate in the certification. They do so citing fears of poor public perception, boycott of non-certified products, and lessened market access for non-certified goods. Each of these "sticks" is an enforcement mechanism that is not unique to sustainability certifications, but is rather also a lever affecting other areas of firm life.
Competition is decried as creating "green noise" that confuses consumers, with little attention paid to the benefits of competition. In the case of forestry, initial and ongoing competition has improved each of the certification regimes operating within the United States. Further, the ongoing "threat" of governmental regulation is also at play.
A competitive regulatory environment is an important feature of private regulation. If a private regulator exercises a monopoly over regulation, it is unclear whether actors will be motivated to fully integrate external stakeholder concerns and maximize enforcement. In contrast, a competitive regulatory environment in which multiple regulators compete creates better outcomes. In other words, we cannot think of certifications as operating in a vacuum, but must instead envision them as operating in a complex and dynamic system of stakeholders. Further study into the market for regulation is needed to tease out the interplay between competing regulatory regimes in corporate social responsibility efforts.
B. Private Regulation
Forest certifications are an example of new governance, in which private regulatory regime operates against the backdrop of existing state and federal laws. 245 They are voluntary systems of rules developed, monitored, and enforced by non-state actors (largely industry groups or environmental nongovernmental organizations).
Certifications have several features we can expect to find in private regulatory regimes, namely a strong similarity to government regulation operated by non-government actors. 246 Certifications show the viability of self-regulation as a complement to government regulation. When the costs of self-regulation are lower than the cost of compliance with externally imposed regulation, self-regulation may still be positively perceived. 247 The increase in legitimacy and use of sustainability certifications support optimism about the power of private regulations to produce socially beneficial outcomes in some circumstances. 245 
C. New Governance
The new governance model envisions non-state actors regulating behavior against a loose backdrop of limited government involvement. The rise of new governance is tied to the failure of government to solve emerging problems. Similarly, forest sustainability certification regimes arose against a backdrop of failed multilateral governance. 248 Attempts to forge a binding international convention to manage forest use failed so notably that most states and even prominent nongovernmental organizations strongly oppose a global forest convention. 249 In this failure of state action, private regulation of the "multilevel multiplayer" kind envisioned by new governance scholars emerged.
The example of forest sustainability certifications represents an important incremental step in establishing the viability of the new governance model. It is inconclusive in evaluating the full extent to which private regulatory regimes will succeed in a new governance framework. The longevity and argued success of forest sustainability certifications provides promise for new governance, although longevity should not be conflated with success. Against a backdrop of weakened government involvement and enforcement, private stakeholders created a robust umbrella of private governance that accommodates competing regulatory systems. In the forest context, new governance approaches accommodate a variety of stakeholders. Further, new governance systems are improving over time-producing governing processes that are more inclusive and environmental results that are welfareenhancing. Important questions remain, however, about the relative involvement of stakeholders and stringency of standards relative to government regulation through democratic process.
D. Implications
This Article looks at new governance from a different lens, studying not the regulation or regulators but instead the institutional environment in which new governance emerges. The case study provides the detailed institutional analysis currently lacking from new government literature. There are several institutional features-such as the existence of strong norms and a sustainability certification program that has continually operated for over seventy years-that may not be duplicable in other industries.
Further study of new governance is necessary. Analysis of the experience of private regulation in other fields will provide crucial windows of insight into whether the features of forestry that contributed to the success of new governance within it are generalizable and, if so, how widely they can or should be duplicated. This Article provides a much needed example of new governance in action. The institutional details transform theoretical ideas
